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Abstract 
 
Although penalties and audits exist, tax evasion is a widespread phenomenon and continues to be 
a problem for many countries.  National culture may contribute to a further understanding of 
intentional noncompliance across countries.  In this study, we investigate the influence of 
national culture on tax compliance levels across 50 countries. Using Hofstede’s (1980) cultural 
framework as a basis for our hypotheses, we find that a noncompliant country’s profile is 
characterized by high uncertainty avoidance, low individualism, low masculinity, and high 
power distance.  Our results have implications for both research and practice.  This is the first 
study to employ Hofstede’s cultural framework as an explanator of international tax compliance 
diversity and serves as the starting point for the development of an international tax compliance 
framework.  Tax policy implications also are addressed. 
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1.  Introduction 
Tax evasion1 is a widespread phenomenon and continues to be a problem for many countries.  
For example, Greece’s underground economy is estimated to equal approximately 40% of GDP – 
the largest in the European Union (“Athens” 1997).  Italian tax authorities estimate that 15% of 
all economic activity goes unreported (“Rome” 1997).  In the United States, estimates of lost tax 
revenues for 2001 were as high as $353 billion.2 Of this $353 billion, intentional underreporting 
of income represented anywhere from $250 to $292 billion (IRS 2005).   
  
Some form of penalty usually is used as a means to control tax evasion within countries.  The 
penalties most commonly used in the United States include fines and imprisonment.  Even 
though penalties and audits exist, tax evasion continues to pose a significant threat to countries’ 
economies by placing a strain on a country’s budget through lost revenues.  Many studies have 
examined the effects of varying penalties, audit rates, and other variables on tax evasion (e.g., 
Porcano 1988, White, Harrison, and Harrell 1993, and Porcano and Price 1993); fewer empirical 
studies have examined tax compliance levels from an international perspective (e.g., Alm, Bahl, 
and Murray 1990; Riahi-Belkaoui 2004; Alm and Torgler 2005; Picur and Riahi-Belkaoui 2006; 
Richardson 2006).  Only Alm and Torgler (2006) investigates the relation of culture to tax 
morale for a “large” number (16) of countries.     
 
                                                 
1 As noted by Sandmo (2005), tax evasion is a violation of tax law whereby the taxpayer refrains from reporting 
income which is, in principle, taxable. Tax avoidance is within the legal framework whereby the taxpayer takes 
advantage of tax provisions to minimize the tax liability. Also, it is important to distinguish between tax evasion and 
corruption, which are very different concepts.  Tax evasion involves hiding the real value of a legal transaction to 
avoid fiscal (i.e., tax) liability, while corruption involves a transaction in which one agent typically pays a sum of 
money or performs a service in exchange for an illicit act by a public official (Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein 1998). 
2 The IRS (2005) updated its estimates of the tax gap for 2001 to $343 billion as the difference between what 
taxpayers should have paid and what they actually paid on a timely basis. This revised figure falls at the high end of 
the range of $312 to $353 billion per year. (IR 2006-28) 
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This study further explores the role that national culture might play in explaining countries’ tax 
evasion behavior.  Culture is a multivariate concept, and this is the first study to use Hofstede’s 
(1980) cultural framework as an explanator of international tax compliance diversity; that is, it 
uses Hofstede’s four cultural dimensions as measures of culture and analyzes their relation to tax 
evasion for 50 countries in various geographic areas. 
 
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to explore the extent to which international differences in 
tax evasion can be explained by differences in national culture, as proposed by Hofstede (1980).  
Hofstede identifies four cultural dimensions, which identify core values that attempt to explain 
general similarities and differences in cultures around the world.  These four cultural dimensions 
are uncertainty avoidance, individualism, masculinity, and power distance.3  This paper links 
Hofstede’s (1980; 2001) notion of culture with tax compliance levels across countries.   
 
The results suggest that Hofstede’s cultural dimensions appear to be relevant in explaining 
international tax evasion levels.  Specifically, higher (lower) uncertainty avoidance and power 
distance are associated with higher (lower) tax evasion levels across countries.  We also find 
support for higher (lower) individualism being associated with lower (higher) tax evasion across 
countries.  We also find that higher masculinity is associated with lower tax evasion levels across 
countries. 
 
                                                 
3 These dimensions are: uncertainty avoidance (UA), the degree to which individuals in a society feel uncomfortable with 
uncertainty and ambiguity; individualism (IND), relates to people’s self-concept of “I” or “we,” or a society’s preference for a 
loosely knit social fabric or a more interdependent , tightly knit social fabric; masculinity (MASC), the extent to which gender 
roles are differentiated within a society and the extent to which traditional masculine values of performance and visible 
achievement are emphasized relative to traditional feminine values of relationships, caring, and nurturing; and power distance 
(PD), the extent to which hierarchy and unequal power distribution in institutions and organizations are accepted.  They are 
discussed further in section 2.2. 
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Our results have implications for both research and practice.  By using Hofstede’s cultural 
framework to investigate international tax compliance diversity, this study adds to the 
development of an international tax compliance framework.  In addition, from a tax policy 
standpoint, the results suggest that policymakers should consider the possible role that national 
culture plays in minimizing the effectiveness of tax evasion penalties.   
 
Further, Joulfaian (2000) found that corporate tax evasion is higher when managed by executives 
who have understated their personal taxes.  This dysfunctional tax compliance behavior becomes 
more troublesome as corporations conduct business in more than one country, subjecting them to 
various countries’ tax laws.  Predispositions to comply with or evade taxes are likely to influence 
whether a company complies, partially complies, or fails to comply with tax laws both within 
and across countries.  Thus, policymakers also should consider culture (“home country”) in 
improving audit-selection models. 
 
Finally, the results have implications on the outsourcing decision regarding accounting and tax 
work.  If such work is outsourced to “low compliance” countries, countries where it is culturally 
accepted to evade taxes, then the quality of the prepared tax return may reflect the preparer’s 
predispositions and thereby require additional scrutiny upon completion by the outsourcing 
company.  Similarly, an additional variable in the audit-selection models would address if tax 
return preparation was outsourced, and if so, to which country it was outsourced.  
 
  
4
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section discusses the relevant theoretical 
background and hypotheses.  This is followed by a description of the data and presentation of the 
results.  The final section offers implications and conclusions. 
 
2.  Theoretical background and hypotheses 
2.1. Tax compliance from an international perspective 
Several studies analyze tax compliance behavior in an international setting.  Alm, Sanchez, and 
De Juan (1990) test a model of tax compliance/evasion behavior using Jamaican data, but they 
do not conduct cross-country comparisons.  Frey and Weck-Hannenmann (1984), using inter-
country survey results, find significant differences in countries’ tax immorality.  Alm et al. 
(1995) use an experimental approach to compare tax compliant behavior in Spain and the U.S.  
Cummings, Martinez-Vanquez, McKee, and Johnson (2004) use experimental and survey data to 
investigate tax compliance behavior in Botswana, South Africa and the United States.  These 
studies find country differences regarding tax compliance levels and attribute these differences 
primarily to differences in: fairness of tax administration; perceived equity of the fiscal 
exchange; and overall attitude toward the government. 
 
Riahi-Belkaoui (2004) looks at the relation of four variables to tax compliance in 30 countries 
(although he uses tax morale and tax compliance interchangeably).  Tax compliance is based on 
views and perceptions of corporate employees who were surveyed for the Global 
Competitiveness Report by the World Economic Forum (1996).  Riahi-Belkaoui finds that 
competition laws, economic freedom, importance of equity market, and incidence of violent 
crimes are related to tax compliance.  Picur and Riahi-Belkaoui (2006) extend Riahi-Belkaoui’s 
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(2004) study by finding that bureaucracy levels, corruption control and tax morale also are 
related to tax compliance in 30 countries. 
 
Alm and Torgler (2006) explore the differences in tax morale and tax compliance between the 
United States and 15 European countries.  Tax morale is based on responses to the World Values 
Survey question dealing with beliefs on whether “cheating on tax is justified if you have the 
chance.”  They do not explore different aspects of culture per se: they use country as a generic 
measure of culture.  In general, they find that tax morale was higher in the United States than 
Spain and higher in Northern European countries than Romanic countries.  Finally, the simple 
correlation between tax morale and the size of the shadow economy (as a percent of GDP) was 
negative – i.e., countries high in tax morale exhibited smaller tax evasion.  
 
Richardson (2006) expands on Riahi-Belkaoui’s (2004) study by analyzing the effects of non-
economic determinants on tax evasion in 45 countries.  Like Riahi-Belkaoui (2004), he also uses 
Global Competitiveness Reports (for years 2002-2004) to obtain measures of tax evasion.  His 
results indicate that tax law complexity, general education level, income source, perceived 
fairness, and tax morale are significantly related to tax evasion across countries. 
 
2.2. National cultural dimensions 
The research discussed in the previous section generally views culture as an individual’s national 
membership and does not consider the complexity and potential multidimensionality of a 
country’s national culture.  Hofstede (1980) presents a multidimensional view of national culture 
and identifies a limited set of societal values which he terms “dimensions” of culture.  These 
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dimensions are determined empirically from a large research project (116,000 surveys) 
examining work-related values of matched samples of employees of a multinational company 
(IBM) in 50 countries and 3 regions.  Hofstede (1980) finds that half of the variance in the 
countries’ mean scores can be explained by four work-related cultural dimensions (determined 
through factor analysis) along which countries differ, and suggests that specific relationships 
exist between these cultural dimensions and individuals’ preferences and actions.  These 
dimensions are strong versus weak uncertainty avoidance, individualism versus collectivism, 
masculinity versus femininity, and large versus small power distance.4  These cultural dimension 
scores normally have a value between 0 and 100, but values below 0 and above 100 are 
technically possible (Hofstede 1994).5  The dimension scores are discussed in more detail below.  
Table 1 reports Hofstede’s index scores for the 50 countries used in this study. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
The four cultural dimensions identify core values that attempt to explain general similarities and 
differences in cultures around the world.  Hofstede’s (1980) framework is used extensively in 
management and other disciplines to examine the influence of culture on organizational 
performance and individual decision making (e.g., Lu, Rose, and Blodgett 1999; Ryan, Horvath, 
Ployhart, Schmitt, and Slade 2000; Thomas and Bendixen 2000).  In addition, numerous 
accounting studies in auditing (e.g., Cohen, Pant, and Sharp 1995; Chan, Lin, and Mo 2003) and 
management accounting (see Harrison and McKinnon 1999 for a review of this literature) show 
that Hofstede’s (1980) dimensions appear to capture the essence of national culture in a way that 
                                                 
4 Hofstede and Bond (1988) present a fifth dimension, Long-/Short-Term Orientation (LTST), or the extent to which 
value is placed on a short-term versus long-term orientation. The current study excludes LTST because scores are 
not available for a large number of the countries examined in this study.  When included in the model, LTST was 
not significant (p>.90). 
5 Thus, the range of scores is quite broad and the scores tend to be viewed as interval data, as evidenced by their 
frequent use as independent variables in regression analyses (see Doupnik and Tsakumis 2004 for a review).   
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is useful in academic research.  The dimensions provide explicit constructs that also can be used 
in considering the impact of culture on countries’ tax evasion levels.6 
 
Hofstede (2001, 34-40) indicates that his cultural values remain relatively stable over time.  
Specifically, he notes that the correlations of his cultural value scores (Hofstede 1980) with 
related variables show no weakening over time.  For example, for life satisfaction data (for the 
years 1982-1998) from 10 European countries, Hofstede shows that, on a year-by-year basis, the 
correlations with the Uncertainty Avoidance Index fluctuate between -.70 and -.87 without any 
trend effects or any changes in the relative rankings of the countries in the dataset.  He makes 
similar observations for his other cultural dimensions. 
 
More importantly, while a country’s dimension score could change, the reliability, validity, 
applicability, and direction of differences of Hofstede’s scores across countries have been 
documented in a number of studies, including: (1) Hoppe (1990) – 17 European countries, 
Turkey and the United States, (2) Merritt (2000) – 19 countries from Asia, Europe, the Middle 
East, North America, and South America, and (3) De Mooij (1998a, 1998b, 2001), who validates 
all four of Hofstede’s dimensions in market research data obtained from consumer surveys 
distributed to 16 European countries.  Recent accounting studies (e.g., Patel 2003; Doupnik and 
Riccio 2006; Tsakumis 2007) have confirmed that even accountant subgroups in countries such 
as Australia, Brazil, Greece, India, Malaysia, and the United States are representative of their 
                                                 
6 Hofstede’s cultural dimensions are related to variables that have been found to significantly influence tax evasion 
(e.g., institutional confidence and the level of corruption in a society).  However, these variables are products of 
countries’ cultural dimensions, which are influenced by outside influences such as nature and trade and origins such 
as geography and history (Hofstede 2001, 12).  Therefore, these variables that have been found to be significantly 
related to tax evasion are not proxies for cultural dimensions but rather attitudes, beliefs, or behaviors that arise as a 
result of a country’s cultural profile, as posited by Hofstede (1980; 2001). 
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national culture, as posited by Hofstede. Taken together, these studies tend to confirm Hofstede’s 
cultural dimensions across several countries from different geographic regions.  
 
2.3. National culture and tax evasion 
2.3.1. Uncertainty Avoidance 
Hofstede (1991, 113) defines uncertainty avoidance as “the extent to which members of a culture 
feel threatened by uncertainty or unknown situations.”  High UA cultures tend to shy away from 
uncertain and ambiguous situations, which can lead to higher levels of anxiety.  It is, however, 
important to note that uncertainty avoidance does not equate to risk avoidance.  Interestingly, 
high UA cultures often are prepared to engage in risky behavior to reduce ambiguities – like 
starting a fight as a preemptive measure or speeding on the highway to save time – if the risky 
action will reduce their anxiety with regard to a specific situation.  Conversely, low UA cultures 
are better able to handle uncertain and ambiguous situations, resulting in lower anxiety levels.  
As a result of these lowered anxiety levels, individuals in low UA societies are not as inclined to 
engage in riskier behavior(s).  Out of 50 countries examined in this study, Greece, Portugal and 
Guatemala rank highest on the UA dimension while Singapore, Jamaica and Denmark score 
lowest on this dimension (see Table 1).      
 
In addition, Hofstede (2001, 171) indicates that peoples’ confidence in their country’s 
government institutions is negatively correlated with uncertainty avoidance.  That is, low UA 
countries are more trusting of their country’s government institutions while individuals in high 
UA countries tend to feel alienated from the government systems that affect their lives.  Further, 
individuals in high UA countries often feel that the legal system is against them and are not 
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opposed to breaking an “unjust” law (Hofstede 2001, 174).  Contributing to this view is the 
finding that higher UA countries have lower economic freedom, or higher taxes (Johnson and 
Lenartowicz 1998).  Thus, individuals in a high UA society should be expected to view tax 
evasion as a means of reducing ambiguity. For example, a lack of trust in their institutions 
encourages tax noncompliance as a means of minimizing the likelihood that the state and its 
politicians misuse the treasury funds. While tax noncompliance might increase anxiety because 
of fear of being caught, this increased anxiety should be offset by the belief that many in the 
country are doing the same thing and the potentially stronger belief regarding government 
misuse of funds. Conversely, individuals in a low UA society, where institutions are viewed as 
more trustworthy, will be less likely to view tax noncompliance as a viable option. Therefore, 
countries high (low) in UA should be more (less) tolerant of corrupt (and riskier) activities, 
which is supported by Vitell, Nwachukwu, and Barnes (1993) and Husted (1999).7    This leads 
to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The higher the UA in a country, the higher the level of tax evasion in that 
country. 
 
 
2.3.2. Individualism  
 
The cultural dimension of individualism (IND) relates to people’s self-concept of “I” or “we.”  
Hofstede suggests that individualism is a preference for a loosely-knit social fabric as opposed to 
collectivism, which suggests an interdependent, tightly-knit social fabric.  The fundamental issue 
is the degree of interdependence a society maintains among individuals.  Under a high IND 
                                                 
7 Vitell, Nwachukwu, and Barnes (1993, 757) support this hypothesized relationship because, “…business 
practitioners in countries that are high in uncertainty avoidance … will be less likely to perceive ethical problems 
than business practitioners in countries that are low in uncertainty avoidance,” while Husted (1999) shows that 
countries higher in uncertainty avoidance have higher levels of corruption.  These studies support Hofstede’s (1991; 
2001) observations that individuals in higher UA countries are often prepared to engage in riskier behavior(s), if 
they deem it justifiable (i.e., uncertainty avoidance does not equate to risk avoidance).   
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perspective, an individual is seen as unique and whole, or having a self-identity which is 
separable from and does not depend on group affiliation.  Conversely, the person seen as a whole 
only when considered in terms of an in-group affiliation characterizes a low score on the IND 
dimension.  It is the group, not the individual, which is seen as the basic unit of society.  Table 1 
shows that countries such as the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom exhibit the 
highest individualism scores while countries like Guatemala, Ecuador and Venezuela score 
lowest (i.e., collectivist) on the IND dimension. 
 
Husted (1999) proposes a connection between collectivism and corruption (bribery and 
extortion).  Specifically, he suggests that collectivist (low IND) societies’ concern for the in 
group – a person’s circle of family, friends, and/or peers – can override written laws, particularly 
if they run counter to a more powerful group code.  Further, Hofstede (2001, 247) notes that 
collectivist societies do not view legal norms as universal and are characterized by the view that 
laws and rights should differ by group, while individualist societies (i.e., high IND) hold the 
view that laws and rights should be equal for all people within a country.  Higher IND countries, 
therefore, tend to have stronger economies (Hofstede 2001, 519), and countries with stronger 
economies usually have stricter regulatory systems.  Tax revenues generated in these countries 
will be higher as people will be less inclined to cheat on their taxes (because of better regulatory 
systems) and have the means to pay their taxes (Braun, Putnam, and Bagchi 2006).  Thus, people 
in a high (low) IND culture should be less (more) tolerant of tax evasion than would people from 
high IND countries.  This leads to the following hypothesis:       
Hypothesis 2: The higher the IND in a country, the lower the level of tax evasion in a 
country. 
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2.3.3. Masculinity 
Masculinity (MASC) refers to the extent to which gender roles are differentiated and the extent 
to which traditional masculine values of performance and visible achievement are emphasized 
relative to traditional feminine values of relationships, caring, and nurturing.  A high score on the 
MASC dimension is characterized by competition and achieving material success.  Conversely, a 
lower score is considered “feminine” and is characterized by mentoring and attaining a higher 
quality of life.8 The highest MASC scores are for Japan, Austria and Venezuela while Sweden, 
Norway and the Netherlands score lowest on the masculinity dimension (see Table 1). 
 
According to Hofstede (1991), high MASC cultures strive for a performance society, which 
focuses on the pursuit of material success in an “unjust world” (Hofstede 2001, 321).  On the 
other hand, low MASC cultures focus on caring for others, the preservation of nurturing values, 
and generally view the world as a “just” place that should provide a minimum quality of life for 
everybody through higher taxes, which are used to subsidize the lower classes (Hofstede 2001, 
317-318).  Husted (1999) finds that the greater the masculinity in a culture, the higher the level 
of corruption (bribery and extortion) within that country.  A similar relationship may be expected 
between tax evasion and MASC.  High MASC countries’ emphasis on material success and 
achievement will contribute to a greater acceptance of tax evasion than in low MASC countries, 
where more emphasis is given to quality of life, people, and the environment. 
 
On the other hand, one could just as easily make a case for a hypothesis in the opposite direction. 
                                                 
8 There has been some criticism of Hofstede’s (1980) use of the terms “masculinity” and “femininity.”  Roberts and 
Salter (1999) rename Hofstede’s (1980) masculinity dimension “achievement orientation,” which is a more accurate 
description of this cultural dimension. 
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For example, the financial reporting literature indicates that the results between MASC and 
disclosure are consistently mixed.  Of the studies that have found a relation, a majority (5 out of 
9) find a positive relation between MASC and disclosure (Doupnik and Tsakumis 2004, 23-24), 
indicating that countries with higher MASC are more likely to disclose information to parties 
outside the firm.  This is consistent with higher MASC cultures’ desire for performance, material 
success, and visible achievement.  A “bragging” culture (Wingate 1997) may be more conscious 
of its tax compliance responsibilities because more visibility (combined with more material 
success) may lead to more scrutiny (e.g., increased probability of a tax audit) by the tax 
authorities.  This is supported by Hofstede (2001, 319), who notes a significant negative 
correlation between MASC and the national Permissiveness Index, indicating that countries with 
higher MASC are less permissive, particularly in dealing with lawbreakers.  Countries with 
higher MASC focus more on punishment, while countries with lower MASC tend to be more 
lenient and focus more on correction and rehabilitation.  Therefore, we present the following 
nondirectional hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: There will be a significant relation between MASC and the level of tax 
evasion in a country. 
 
 
2.3.4. Power Distance 
Power distance (PD) refers to the extent to which hierarchy and unequal power distribution in 
institutions and organizations are accepted.  The main concern is the way in which societies 
handle the problem of human inequality.  High PD societies are characterized by the acceptance 
of inequality and its institutionalization in hierarchies, which locate people in their “rightful” 
places.  Conversely, low PD societies are characterized by a norm value that inequalities between 
people should be minimized, and to the extent that hierarchies exist within a society and its 
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organizations, they exist only for administrative convenience.  Table 1 shows that Malaysia, 
Guatemala and Panama score highest on PD while Austria, Israel and Denmark score the lowest 
on the PD dimension. 
    
In high PD countries, Hofstede (1991) suggests the existence of an implied consensus where 
there is an order of inequality in which everybody has his or her place.  This consensus is 
accompanied by a certain level of leniency toward rules of civil morality (Hofstede 2001, 99).  
For example, high PD countries are characterized by an acceptance that those in power are 
entitled to privileges, which they are expected to use in enhancing their wealth.  Also, scandals 
involving persons in power are expected, and so is the fact that they will be covered up.  Further, 
wage differentials in high PD countries are large, resulting in a major income gap between the 
upper and lower classes (Hofstede 1991, 39; Hofstede 2001, 112).  These large income 
differentials are further increased by the tax system (Begue 1976), potentially creating more of a 
tax evasion incentive.  By contrast, individuals in low PD cultures view inequality as undesirable 
and believe that power and wealth do not necessarily go together.  In addition, low PD societies 
are not tolerant of political scandals, which usually signify the end of a political career.  Unlike 
high PD countries, low PD countries exhibit lower income differentials, which are further 
reduced by more progressive tax rate systems.  Husted (1999) supports this argument by showing 
that increased PD in a country is associated with higher corruption.  Accordingly, we posit that 
high PD countries should tolerate corrupt activities such as tax evasion more than would low PD 
countries.  This leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: The higher the PD in a country, the higher the level of tax evasion in a 
country.   
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2.3.5. Control Variable 
 
The level of economic development in a country may influence its level of tax evasion.  For 
example, Treisman (2000) found that rich countries generally have less corruption than poor 
countries, with as much as 50 to 73 percent of the variations in corruption indices being 
explained by variations in per capita income levels.  We expect a similar relationship between 
countries’ levels of economic development and their tax evasion levels. Also, while the four 
cultural variables represent independent dimensions and should not be systematically correlated, 
Hofstede (2001, 63) notes that there is a significant relation between IND and PD, which 
becomes insignificant when controlling for level of economic development (i.e., GNP per 
capita).  Thus, we include the level of economic development in a country, measured as the 
natural log of GNP per capita (LNGNP), as a control variable in this study.  We expect a 
negative relation between the level of economic development and the level of tax evasion in a 
country. 
 
3.  Research design 
Hofstede (1980) provides index scores for the four national cultural dimensions for the 50 
countries.  Thus, this study investigates tax evasion levels across the same 50 countries.  It 
analyzes the relation of the four dimensions to tax evasion. 
 
3.1. Dependent Variable 
Our hypotheses relate to the impact of national cultural dimensions on tax evasion levels across 
countries.  Actual evasion is unknown and impossible to determine; thus, studies on tax evasion 
(tax compliance) use surrogate measures for actual evasion.  Many studies use hypothetical 
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evasion or perceptions of evasion.  Some use government estimates of evasion.  No single 
measure has been shown to be better than any other measure.  
 
Previous research examining international tax evasion (e.g., Riahi-Belkaoui 2004, Alm & 
Torgler 2005) uses individuals’ perceptions about tax evasion as a proxy for a country’s tax 
evasion.  We follow this line of research by using an economic estimate of actual unreported 
income within a country as a proxy for tax evasion.  Specifically, a country’s shadow economy 
divided by its GDP serves as our proxy for tax evasion (TXEVAS).  It is taken from Schneider 
(2004).  Schneider estimates the shadow economy (estimates of all market-based legal 
production of goods and services that are deliberately concealed from public authorities) for 145 
developing, transition, and developed countries.  He also reports the shadow economy variable as 
a percentage of official GDP in each country for the years 2000-2002.  Countries with larger 
shadow economies (as a percentage of GDP) are viewed as less tax compliant countries (i.e., 
higher (lower) underreporting of income equates to more (less) tax evasion).  Therefore, the 
larger the value of TXEVAS, the greater is the extent of tax evasion in a country.    
 
Table 2 lists the sample countries along with their mean tax evasion scores across the years 
2000-2002.  These countries are located in all parts of the globe, range from large to small, and 
include both developed and developing nations.  The three highest scores (i.e., the least tax 
compliant countries) are Panama, Peru and Thailand.  The United States, Switzerland, and 
Austria are the most tax compliant.  The sample countries’ tax evasion rankings are consistent 
for the years 2000-2002. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
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3.2. Independent Variables 
Measures for the independent variables UA, IND, MASC, and PD are shown in Table 1 and are 
taken from Hofstede (1980).  In addition, a control variable, LNGNP, was included in the 
multivariate analysis.  LNGNP was measured as the natural logarithm of country GNP, which 
was obtained from the World Bank (2002).9  
 
3.3. Model Specification 
To test our hypotheses, we estimate the following model: 
TXEVASi = a0 + a1UAi + a2INDi + a3MASCi + a4PDi + a5LNGNPi + ei        (1) 
  Expected Sign        (+)         (-)    (NA)        (+) (-)  
The primary variables of interest are UA, IND, MASC, and PD.  Our hypotheses predict a 
positive sign on UA (higher UA leads to higher tax evasion in a country), a negative sign on IND 
(higher IND leads to lower tax evasion in a country), no direction on MASC, and a positive sign 
on PD (higher PD leads to higher tax evasion in a country).  Also, we expect a negative sign on 
our control variable, LNGNP, with more economically-developed countries experiencing lower 
levels of tax evasion.  The results discussed in the next section are stable (i.e., not significantly 
different) for the time period 2000-2002.  Therefore, we pooled the data for hypothesis testing 
purposes.  
 
4.  Results 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
                                                 
9 A similar measure, GDP per capita, also was obtained from the International Monetary Fund (2002).  The model 
was run with this variable and the results were similar to those reported in the next section.   
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Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the full sample of 50 countries for the years 2000-2002.  
Considerable diversity exists with regard to tax evasion levels across countries.  The estimated 
shadow economy in a country (as a percentage of GDP) ranges from 8.40% to 65.30% with a 
mean of 27.22% during the three-year period.  At the extremes, these figures indicate that one 
country’s estimated shadow economy represents only 8.40% of its GDP, whereas another 
country’s estimated shadow economy represents approximately 65% of GDP.  There is 
considerable variability in the independent variables of primary interest.  UA ranges from 8 to 
112 (mean = 65.90), IND ranges from 6 to 91 (mean = 43.94), MASC ranges from 5 to 95 (mean 
= 48.92), and PD ranges from 11 to 104, with a mean of 55.82.10  There is also considerable 
variability in the control variable; GNP per capita ranges from $420 to $38,730 with a mean of 
$13,095 per country.11   
[Insert Table 3 here] 
4.2. Hypothesis Testing 
Table 4 reports the results from estimating the multiple regression model specified in equation 1.  
The model is highly significant (F = 43.056, p < .0001) and the independent variables explain a 
relatively high percentage of variation in the dependent variable (adjusted R2 of .585).  The 
                                                 
10 It is important to note that there are no countries that exhibit high or low cultural dimension scores “across the 
board.”  However, countries in the same cultural area (Hofstede 1980) can exhibit similar patterns across the four 
cultural dimensions.  For example, the Anglo cultural group (e.g., Australia, Canada, United States, and United 
Kingdom) tends to exhibit lower UA, higher IND, higher MASC, lower PD, and lower tax evasion levels, which is 
consistent with our findings.  Conversely, the Near Eastern (e.g., Greece, Iran, Turkey, and Yugoslavia) and Less 
Developed Latin (e.g., Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Uruguay) cultural areas tend to exhibit higher UA, 
lower IND, lower MASC, higher PD, and higher tax evasion levels, which is also consistent with our findings.   
11 The impact of variable correlations on the regression results was examined by computing variance inflation 
factors (VIF).  Within this study’s data, the largest VIF was 2.55, which is well below the criterion value of 10.0 
suggested by Neter, Wasserman, and Kutner (1985) and the 5.3 cutoff proposed by Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and 
Black (1992) for signifying severe multicollinearity.  We also ran interactive models.  The inclusion of interaction 
terms (for the four dimensions) results in significant variability in the collinearity diagnostics (i.e., VIFs well above 
the acceptable limits), only one interaction term was significant and the results did not change with respect to the 
four dimensions.  As such, we use the model presented in the paper. 
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results for the primary variables of interest are the same both with and without the inclusion of 
the control variable (GNP per capita) in the model.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that higher UA is related to higher tax evasion levels across countries.  
Even after controlling for the level of economic development across countries, the regression 
coefficient for UA is positive and significant (p < .0001).  Thus, we conclude that higher UA is 
related to higher tax evasion levels across countries, supporting hypothesis 1. 
 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that lower IND is related to higher tax evasion levels across countries.  
The regression coefficient of IND is negative and significant (p = .005).  This result suggests that 
lower (higher) IND is related to higher (lower) tax evasion, providing support for hypothesis 2. 
 
Although a direction was not hypothesized, hypothesis 3 predicted that MASC is related to tax 
evasion levels across countries.  As expected, a significant relation was found. MASC is 
moderately significant and negatively related with tax evasion levels across countries.  
Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is supported. 
 
Hypothesis 4 predicted that higher PD is related to higher tax evasion levels across countries.  As 
expected, the regression coefficient for PD is positive and significant (p = .014). Higher PD is 
related to higher tax evasion levels across countries, supporting hypothesis 4. 
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4.3. Control Variable 
 Table 4 also reports a significant relation between the level of economic development 
(LNGNP) and tax evasion levels across countries.  The regression coefficient for LNGNP is 
negative and highly significant (p < .0001).  Thus, as expected, higher (lower) levels of 
economic development are associated with lower (higher) levels of tax evasion across countries. 
 
5.  Implications and conclusions 
In this study, we investigated the influence of Hofstede’s (1980) cultural dimensions on tax 
compliance levels across 50 countries.  Taken as a whole, our results support the general 
proposition that national culture, as proposed by Hofstede, is a significant factor in explaining 
tax evasion levels across countries.  The results of the proposed model (equation 1) show that 
three of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions are related to international tax evasion levels in the 
expected directions.  Specifically, the results indicate that higher (lower) uncertainty avoidance 
and power distance are associated with higher (lower) tax evasion levels across countries while 
higher (lower) individualism is associated with lower (higher) tax evasion across countries, as 
hypothesized. This result is consistent with research examining the relationship between 
Hofstede’s framework and global financial reporting, particularly for uncertainty avoidance and 
individualism (see Doupnik and Tsakumis 2004 for a review of this literature).  We also find that 
higher (lower) masculinity is associated with lower (higher) tax evasion.   
 
This study employed Hofstede’s cultural framework as a means to explain international tax 
compliance diversity.  The results suggest that national culture is useful in explaining tax evasion 
levels across countries.  Based on our results, we can describe a tentative cultural profile of a low 
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tax compliance country (i.e., a high tax evasion country) as one that possesses high UA, low 
IND, low MASC, and high PD.  These results may aid in directing future research by serving as 
the beginning of a framework for future international tax compliance studies. 
 
Our results should be of interest to policymakers.  Specifically, policymakers should consider 
cultural values when designing tax compliance legislation and investigating possible behavior 
irregularities.  Some of the tax compliance penalties that work well in the U.S. may not work 
well in countries with different cultural profiles.  For example, Porcano and Price (1993) shows 
that social stigmatization (e.g., announcement of a taxpayer’s activities in the newspaper) has a 
significant deterrent effect on individuals’ hypothetical tax evasion.  Furthermore, several states 
in the U.S. have been successful in reducing tax evasion through their social stigmatization 
programs (Herman 2004a; 2004b).  While social stigmatization may be an effective penalty for 
tax evaders in the U.S. – a country with lower UA, higher IND, lower MASC, and lower PD – it 
may not have the same deterrent effect in a country with a less tax compliant cultural profile.  A 
less tax compliant country’s (higher UA, lower IND, and higher PD) citizens may react 
differently to a social stigmatization penalty.  In a country where tax evasion is common 
practice, being punished and subsequently disclosed as an offender may not be sufficient to 
trigger the stigmatization process. 
 
Additionally, the results have implications for audit-selection models and outsourcing of tax 
return preparation.  Firms continue to outsource accounting and tax work (e.g., Engardio, 
Bernstein, and Kripalani 2003) and research by the McKinsey Global Institute indicates that up 
to 31 percent of finance and accounting jobs could be exported by 2008 (Thottam 2005).  While 
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India is the leader in outsourcing work, a report from market research firm Gartner, Inc. notes 
that a host of emerging countries such as the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Eastern 
European nations (including Hungary and Poland) are starting to challenge India's leadership in 
offshore business process outsourcing (Bhatnaqar 2005).  Some of the countries to which work is 
being outsourced are low tax compliant countries, and these lower compliance levels are due in 
part to their cultural profiles.  If this behavior transfers to their accounting and tax return 
preparation work then such tax returns would have higher noncompliant rates.  As such, the 
efficacy of audit-selection models might be improved if they incorporate an additional variable 
(if return preparation was outsourced, and if so, then to which country it was outsourced).    
 
Audit selection models by their nature use profiling; the selection variables are used because in 
the aggregate they help develop a profile of each tax filer as one with “good” or “poor” audit 
potential.  The results suggest that a country’s audit program should take nationality into 
consideration.  That is, when examining corporate returns and nonresident returns, an additional 
variable used for audit selection should be home country.  Given the large number of 
multinational corporations (MNCs) conducting business in many countries and foreign nationals 
working in many countries, using such a variable might reduce tax evasion by foreign MNCs and 
individuals.  For example, if tax evasion is high in Greece and accepted, then perhaps Greek 
companies and citizens working abroad tend to be more noncompliant than other companies and 
individuals.  Using home country as an additional selection variable might better identify 
evaders. 
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Some limitations of the current study also should be addressed.  First, Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions were developed over 20 years ago, which may make them appear outdated.  
However, it is important to note that several studies (e.g., Hoppe 1990; Merritt 2000) confirm the 
reliability, validity, applicability, and direction of differences of Hofstede’s scores over time and 
across countries.  Second, the current study focuses on national cultural dimensions as the 
primary explanators of tax evasion levels across countries.  To develop a more complete 
international tax compliance model, future research should examine other variables (e.g., 
countries’ legal systems) in conjunction with national culture.  Third, this study’s sample 
consisted of 50 countries.  Therefore, additional research may be needed to ensure that the results 
are generalizable to other countries.  In addition, future research should examine the role of 
national culture in mitigating the efficacy of tax evasion penalties within and across countries.   
It also should explore the use of “home country” and “tax return preparation outsourced” as 
additional variables in audit-selection models. 
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Table 1 
Cultural dimension scores for sample countries 
 
Country UA IND MASC PD  Country UA IND MASC PD 
 
Argentina 86 46 56 49 
Australia 51 90 61 36 
Austria  70 55 79 11 
Belgium  94 75 54 65 
Brazil  76 38 49 69 
Canada  48 80 52 39 
Chile  86 23 28 63 
Colombia 80 13 64 67 
Costa Rica 86 15 21 35 
Denmark 23 74 16 18 
Ecuador  67 8 63 78 
El Salvador 94 19 40 66 
Finland  59 63 26 33 
France  86 71 43 68 
Germany 65 67 66 35 
Greece  112 35 57 60 
Guatemala 101 6 37 95 
Hong Kong 29 25 57 68 
India  40 48 56 77 
Indonesia 48 14 46 78 
Iran  59 41 43 58 
Ireland  35 70 68 28 
Israel  81 54 47 13 
Italy  75 76 70 50 
Jamaica  13 39 68 45 
Japan  92 46 95 54 
Malaysia 36 26 50 104 
Mexico  82 30 69 81 
Netherlands 53 80 14 38 
New Zealand 49 79 58 22 
Norway  50 69 8 31 
Pakistan  70 14 50 55 
Panama  86 11 44 95 
Peru  87 16 45 64 
Philippines 44 32 64 94 
Portugal  104 27 31 63 
Singapore 8 20 48 74 
South Africa 49 65 63 49 
South Korea 85 18 39 60 
Spain  86 51 42 57 
Sweden  29 71 5 31 
Switzerland 58 68 70 34 
Taiwan  69 17 45 58 
Thailand 64 20 34 64 
Turkey  85 37 45 66 
United Kingdom 35 89 66 35 
United States 46 91 62 40 
Uruguay  100 36 38 61 
Venezuela 76 12 73 81 
Yugoslavia 88 27 21 76 
 
 
 
UA = Hofstede suggests that societies high on the UA dimension prefer to reduce uncertainty or ambiguity by relying on written or    
unwritten rules of behavior, formalization of organizational structure, and standardization of procedures.  By contrast, societies low on 
the UA dimension, are more flexible and tolerant of behavior and opinions that differ from their own. 
 
IND = People focusing on themselves rather than on the group(s) to which they may belong characterize a high score on the IND index. 
Conversely, the person seen as a whole only when considered in terms of an in-group affiliation characterizes a low score on the IND 
index.  It is the group, not the individual that is seen as the basic unit of society.  
 
MASC = A high score on the MASC dimension is characterized by competition and achieving material success.  Conversely, a lower score is 
considered “feminine” and is characterized by mentoring and attaining a higher quality of life. 
 
PD= High PD societies are characterized by the acceptance of inequality and its institutionalization in hierarchies, which locate people in 
their “rightful” places.  Conversely, low PD societies are characterized by a norm value that inequalities between people should be 
minimized, and to the extent that hierarchies exist within a society and its organizations, they exist only for administrative 
convenience. 
 
Source: Index values originally reported in Hofstede (1980, 315). 
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Table 2 
Tax evasion levels for sample countries* 
  
Country   Tax Evasion Score 
 
Argentina   27.13 
Australia   13.97 
Austria    10.43 
Belgium    21.73 
Brazil    41.00 
Canada    15.67 
Chile    20.33 
Colombia   41.27 
Costa Rica   27.00 
Denmark   17.73 
Ecuador    35.40 
El Salvador   47.23 
Finland    17.83 
France    14.90 
Germany   16.37 
Greece    28.47 
Guatemala   51.93 
Hong Kong   16.97 
India    24.30 
Indonesia   21.37 
Iran    19.40 
Ireland    15.63 
Israel    22.87 
Italy    26.60 
Jamaica    37.70 
 
Country   Tax Evasion Score 
 
Japan    11.03 
Malaysia   31.63 
Mexico    31.70 
Netherlands   12.90 
New Zealand   12.57 
Norway    18.83 
Pakistan    37.80 
Panama    64.83 
Peru    60.37 
Philippines   44.50 
Portugal    22.37 
Singapore   13.40 
South Africa   29.00 
South Korea   28.13 
Spain    22.40 
Sweden    18.89 
Switzerland     9.13 
Taiwan    26.57 
Thailand   53.34 
Turkey    33.20 
United Kingdom   12.47 
United States     8.60  
Uruguay    51.47 
Venezuela   35.13 
Yugoslavia   37.60 
 
   
 
* The tax evasion scores are mean estimates of each country’s shadow economy (i.e., estimates of all market-based legal production of goods and 
services that are deliberately concealed from public authorities) as a percentage of GDP for the years 2000-2002 and are taken from Schneider 
(2004).  Countries with larger (smaller) shadow economies (as a percentage of GDP) represent higher (lower) tax evasion countries. 
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Table 3 
Descriptive statistics 
 
 
Variable*  n Minimum Maximum Mean      Median   SD 
 
Dependent 
 
TXEVAS  150      8.40       65.30  27.22        23.50 13.81   
Independent 
 
UA   150       8        112   65.90        69.50 24.75 
IND   150       6          91   43.94        38.50 25.68  
MASC   150       5          95   48.92        49.50 18.69   
PD   150     11        104   55.82        59.00 21.84   
GNP (in US$)  150   420   38,730  13,095      10,325        11,551 
LNGNP  150  6.04     10.56     8.86          9.24   1.29  
 
 
 
*Variable definitions and data sources: 
 
TXEVAS The tax evasion dependent variable is an estimate of each country’s shadow 
economy (i.e., estimates of all market-based legal production of goods and 
services that are deliberately concealed from public authorities) as a percentage 
of GDP for the years 2000-2002; obtained from Schneider (2004).  Countries 
with larger (smaller) shadow economies (as a percentage of GDP) represent 
higher (lower) tax evasion countries.  These statistics are based on absolute 
amounts for the sample countries over the 2000-2002 time period.  Table 2 shows 
the mean TXEVAS score for each country over the same time period.   
 
UA, IND,  
MASC, and PD  See Table 1 for variable definitions; obtained from Hofstede (1980). 
 
GNP GNP per capita by country for the years 2000-2002; obtained from the World 
Bank (2002). 
 
LNGNP  Natural log of GNP per capita. 
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Table 4 
Regression results* 
 
TXEVASi = a0 + a1UAi + a2INDi + a3MASCi + a4PDi + a5LNGNPi + ei 
 
  
 
Independent Variable   (Exp. Sign)    B      t-statistic Sig.** 
 
 
UA  (H1)      (Pos.)    .208        3.676           <.0001 
 
IND  (H2)      (Neg.)  -.205      -2.432  0.005   
 
MASC  (H3)   (Pos.)  -.095      -1.780  0.077 
 
PD  (H4)   (Pos.)    .169    2.228  0.014 
 
LNGNP    (Neg.)  -.397      -5.293           <.0001 
 
 
F = 43.056, p < .0001, Adjusted R2 = 0.585 
 
 
*See Table 3 for variable definitions. 
 
** One-tailed p-values except for MASC, which was a nondirectional hypothesis. 
 
